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I. INTRODUCTION
In seeking to vindicate their right to self-determination, indigenous
peoples seek not only recognition and protection of land rights and political
rights, but also recognition and protection of cultural and religious rights.
These cultural and religious rights have been described as including such
rights as the right to practice and perpetuate cultural traditions and to
control cultural property; the right to practice religious traditions and
ceremonies and to have access to sacred sites; the right to repatriation of
human remains and objects of religious and cultural significance; and the
right to use and preserve languages, oral traditions, and literature.'
My comments focus on the experience of Native Americans, both
historically and more recently, in seeking recognition and protection of
their cultural and religious rights,2 and what this experience can tell us
* Associate Professor, New England School of Law
1. Under the terms of the "International Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations,
Authorized Version Initialed July 28, 1994," for example, "The Cultural Rights of Nations" are
described as follows:
Para. 11 ... the right to practice their cultural traditions and evolve culture in relation
to lands and territories without interference. This includes the right to maintain,
protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their culture.... as
well as the right to the restitution of cultural, religious and spiritual property taken
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws;
Para. 12.. .the right to manifest, practice and teach spiritual and religious traditions,
customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect and have access in privacy to
religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of ceremonial objects; and
the right to the repatriation of human remains.
Para. 13.. .the right to instill, use, develop and transmit to future generations their
languages, oral traditions, writing systems and literature, and to designate and maintain
their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. It should be noted that it is inherently problematic to speak in terms of the cultural
rights and religious rights of Native Americans as if these were separate categories of rights. In
the traditional Native American world view, there is no clear-cut distinction between what is
cultural and what is religious. JOSEPH EPES BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 1 (1982). Rather, religion and spirituality pervade all aspects of life.
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about the struggle faced by indigenous peoples in seeking to vindicate their
rights to cultural and religious self-determination. I will first discuss the
experience of Native Americans with respect to religious ceremonies and
practices. If time permits, I will also discuss federal legislation aimed at
protecting Native American rights with respect to human remains and
objects of cultural and religious significance.
II. THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Historical Picture
Historically, the federal government's policy toward Native
American religions consisted of two key components: first, the conversion
of the Native Americans to Christianity through government-supported
missionary activities, and secondly, the direct suppression of Native
American ceremonies and traditions, at times by force. This two-fold
policy was maintained despite the constitutional questions which the policy
raised under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the Constitution.'
1. Christianization Efforts
From the earliest days of the United States, the federal government
viewed the conversion of the Native Americans to Christianity as a key
part of government policy, and accordingly provided financial and other
assistance to Christian missionaries.' Christianization was viewed as a
necessary part of the government's efforts to "civilize" the Native
Americans. Government support of Christianization efforts culminated in
the so-called "Peace Policy" of 1869 to 1882, during which the federal
government allotted the Indian agencies to various Christian religious
This holistic world view has led to difficulties for Native Americans seeking protection for
traditional practices, particularly because the U.S. Constitution refers to the right to the free
exercise of religion, but does not refer to cultural rights. See, e.g., New Rider v. Board of
Education, 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973), reh'g denied, 415
U.S. 939 (1974) (court refused to treat as constitutional in nature Indian students' claim that
school hair regulations violated the Free Exercise Clause because long hair had religious
significance). For a fuller description of the Native American world view and religious
traditions, see Allison M. Dussias, Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological
Resources and Native American Rights, 55 MD. L. REV. 84 (1996).
3. The relevant portion of the First Amendment, referred to as the Religion Clauses,
provides as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See generally R. PIERCE BEAVER, CHURCH, STATE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS:
Two AND A HALF CENTURIES OF PARTNERSHIP IN MISSIONS BETWEEN PROTESTANT CHURCHES
AND GOVERNMENT (1966).
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groups for the stated purpose of Christianization, and called upon
Protestant religious groups to nominate government Indian agents.,
Although these practices seem incredible today, in the nineteenth century
federal government officials viewed them as a necessary part of
government policy. Thus in 1869, a report by the U.S. Board of Indian
Commissioners could state quite plainly and openly that the duty of the
government was to educate Native Americans "in the principles of
Christianity ... [and that] [t]he establishment of Christian missions should
be encouraged . . . ." "The religion of our blessed Saviour is believed to
be the most effective agent for the civilization of any people." 6  The
alliance between church and state was not seriously questioned on
constitutional grounds until late in the nineteenth century, when Protestant
groups became alarmed over the amount of government funding which was
provided to Catholic-run schools for Native Americans.7 As a result,
direct government funding of sectarian schools for Native Americans was
ended, but only in response to anti-Catholic prejudice, not out of concern
for the right of the Native Americans to practice their traditional religions.
2. Suppression of Religious Ceremonies
In addition to attempting to destroy traditional religions by
supplanting them with Christianity, the federal government also made
more direct efforts to suppress religious ceremonies and practices, such as
the Ghost Dance and other ceremonial dances.8 The efforts to suppress the
Ghost Dance culminated in the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre, in which
over 100 Sioux men, women and children were killed by government
troops. 9 Although the government's efforts to suppress traditional religious
ceremonies and practices have not always been so violent, these efforts
persisted as late as the 1920s.'0
In short, the government's policy toward Native American
religious rights into the early part of the twentieth century demonstrated a
5. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS:
CHRISTIAN REFORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900 (1976).
6. 1869 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS 10.
7. ROBERT F. KELLER, AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, 1869-82, at 208-09 (1983).
8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. KELLY, THE ASSAULT ON ASSIMILATION: JOHN COLLIER
AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLICY REFORM 321-26 (1983) (describing efforts to suppress
ceremonial dances).
9. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 288-94 (1970).
10. In the 1920s, Indian superintendents were instructed to restrict ceremonial dances and
to be prepared to repress them by punitive measures if they persisted. See KELLY, supra note 8,
at 303-04.
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systematic and at times violent denial of the right to religious
self-determination. Where Native Americans were concerned, the
protections which the Constitution's Religion Clauses purported to provide
simply did not apply.
B. Twentieth Century Efforts to Vindicate Religious Rights
Although Native Americans are no longer subjected to express
government-backed Christianization efforts or direct government
suppression of traditional religious practices and ceremonies, when Native
Americans have turned to the federal courts for protection against
infringements upon their right to the free exercise of religion, they have
faced an uphill battle. In recent years a generally unsympathetic Supreme
Court has even dismissed threats to Native American free exercise rights
as an unavoidable consequence of a democratic political system." In most
of these cases, federal courts have been willing to subordinate the religious
rights of Native Americans to other rights and objectives, such as
government property rights.
Although a comprehensive review of the federal court cases which
have addressed Native American free exercise claims is beyond the scope
of this presentation,'2 I will briefly describe two Supreme Court cases
dealing with Native American free exercise claims and discuss what
lessons they may teach about the obstacles that indigenous peoples face in
seeking to vindicate their religious rights.
1. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association
In 1988, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association,'3 Native American plaintiffs challenged decisions by the U.S.
Forest Service to complete construction of a logging road and to permit
timber harvesting in a portion of a California national forest which was
considered sacred by three tribes, who made regular use of the sacred area
for a number of religious purposes. The plaintiffs maintained that
completion of the Forest Service's plans would desecrate the area, and
violate their free exercise rights."1
11. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892
(1990).
12. The author is currently writing an article which analyzes the twentieth century Native
American free exercise cases in the context of the history of government policy toward Native
American religious rights, and discusses how the twentieth century cases reflect this history and
perpetuate the failure to protect religious freedom.
13. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
14. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442-43.
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At first glance, the case may have seemed to be a strong one for
the plaintiffs. Not only does the Constitution protect the right to free
exercise of religion, which it was undisputed would be severely infringed
by the Forest Service's plans, but also a federal statute, the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA) provided that it was the
government's policy to protect the right of Native Americans to exercise
their traditional religions, including access to sites.' 5 The Supreme Court
concluded, however, that even if the Court were to assume that the
government's proposed actions would virtually destroy the plaintiffs'
ability to practice their religion, 6 the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit
the government's proposed actions.'1 The Court stated that the plaintiffs'
free exercise rights did not limit the government's right "to use what is,
after all, its land."' The Court ignored the congressional policy embodied
in AIRFA on the grounds that the statute did not explicitly provide for a
cause of action.' 9
What are the lessons to be learned from the Lyng case? First,
Lyng demonstrated the general difficulty that indigenous peoples can have
in vindicating their right to practice religions which are different from
mainstream religions. More specifically, Lyng demonstrated the difficulty
of establishing rights with respect to sacred sites, which have a significance
for Native Americans which may often be imperfectly comprehended by
judges who are more familiar with religions in which sacred sites do not
have comparable importance. In Native American religious traditions, the
land itself is sacred, with certain locations having particular significance as
places of revelation and communication with the spirits.2° For judges who
are more accustomed, however, to religions in which ceremonies can be
conducted in any church, synagogue or mosque, it may well be difficult to
comprehend and protect a religion in which specific sites are considered
15. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)). The Act
provides as follows:
It shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonial and traditional rites.
16. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
17. Id. at 441-42. The Court relied on the fact that the effects of the government's actions
on religion were incidental, rather than involving "indirect coercion or penalties on the free
exercise of religion." Id. at 450.
18. Id. at 453.
19. Id. at 454-55.
20. VINE DEIORIA, JR., GOD Is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 67-68 (2d ed. 1992).
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unique, such that a ceremony which is traditionally performed at a certain
site which is being destroyed cannot simply be moved to a different site.
Secondly, Lyng showed the willingness of federal courts to subordinate
Native American religious rights to other interests, such as government
property rights, despite the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion and the statutory protection for Native American religious rights
which appeared to be embodied in AIRFA.
2. Employment Division v. Smith
The second Supreme Court case which I will discuss, Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,"1 involved
two members of the Native American Church who brought a free exercise
claim after they were denied unemployment benefits when they were fired
because of their use of the drug peyote as part of a Native American
Church ceremony. 2  Members of the Native American Church view
peyote as the embodiment of their deity, and ingestion of peyote is the
church's essential ritual.23 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, even
though the dismissal of the plaintiffs had been based on their participation
in a religious ceremony.24 The Court did not even require the government
to establish a compelling interest to justify the infringement on the
plaintiffs' free exercise rights, which the Court had required in previous
free exercise cases. 25
Like the Lyng case, the Smith case demonstrated the difficulty that
Native Americans have continued to have in the twentieth century in
vindicating their right to practice their religions. As Justice Blackmun
noted in a dissenting opinion in Smith, the First Amendment and the
congressional policy reflected in AIRFA have offered to Native Americans
"merely an unfulfilled and hollow promise. "26 The fact that Native
American plaintiffs, armed with the Constitution and AIRFA, have had
such a difficult time vindicating their religious rights in U.S. courts does
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
22. Id. at 873-74. State law classified peyote as a controlled substance, possession of
which was a felony. Id. at 874. The federal government and twenty-three states had exemptions
in their drug laws for religious use of peyote. Id. at 912 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
25. Id. at 881-89.
26. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a more extensive discussion of Smith and
Justice Blackmun's opinion, see Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands of Justice: Justice
Blackmun's Indian Law Opinions, 71 N.D. L. REV. 41, 77-82 (1995).
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not bode well for the prospects of other indigenous peoples in their quests
for religious self-determination.
There is a possibility, however, that Native American free exercise
claimants may fare better in future cases under the terms of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 19937 (RFRA), a federal statute which was
enacted in response to the Smith decision. RFRA designated the
compelling governmental interest test which the Court ignored in Smith as
the appropriate standard for evaluating free exercise claims.2 8 There are
no guarantees, however, that RFRA will provide any greater protection for
Native American religious practices, because it still allows for substantial
burdens on free exercise rights as long as the compelling governmental
interest test is satisfied. It is not difficult to imagine that federal courts
which have previously been unsympathetic to Native American religious
claims will only rarely find that challenged governmental actions fail to
satisfy the test..2 9 RFRA may thus prove to be no more useful than AIRFA
in protecting Native American religious freedom.
Another recent development in the protection of Native American
religious rights was the enactment in 1994 of amendments to AIRFA, 0
which were designed to ensure the lawfulness, under state and federal law,
of the ceremonial use of peyote by tribal members.3' These amendments
did not, however, strengthen the provisions of AIRFA as far as other
Native American religious practices and ceremonies were concerned.
27. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I to 2000bb-4
(1994).
28. Id. Under the terms of the statute, government "may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person--(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
29. In Diaz v. Collins, for example, a federal district court rejected the free exercise
claims of a Native American prison inmate under RFRA on the grounds that the prison
regulations challenged by the plaintiff either passed the compelling governmental interest test or
did not substantially burden religious practices and therefore were not even subject to the test.
Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353, 358-60 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
30. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344,
108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994)).
31. The amendments provided in part that "the use, possession, or transportation of peyote
by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any
State." 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (1994).
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III. THE RIGHT TO THE PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION OF HUMAN
REMAINS AND CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS OBJECTS
Another important right of Native Americans and of indigenous
peoples, in general, is the right to recover possession of, and to protect
and maintain, human remains and objects of cultural and religious
significance. A federal statute, the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act of 199032 (NAGPRA), specifically recognized certain
Native American rights and interests with respect to human remains and
certain objects of cultural and religious significance.
NAGPRA was enacted for two basic reasons. First, Congress
recognized that certain objects, including human remains, had special
religious and cultural significance for Native Americans, and that the
federal government was obligated, as part of its trust responsibility to
tribes, to respect this significance by protecting tribal rights with respect to
such objects and remains. Secondly, extensive past desecration and
plundering of Native American graves and objects of cultural and religious
significance, 3  at times with the active assistance of the federal
government," had demonstrated the need for protection of Native
American remains and objects, including both those which had already
been removed and those which had not yet been excavated. 5
32. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013
(Supp. 1994)).
33. See generally James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of
Imperial Archaeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11 (1992).
34. Id. at 19-20.
35. An earlier statute, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA), 16
U.S.C. § 470aa-70mm (1988 & Supp. 1994)), established a permitting process for the excavation
and removal of "archaeological resources" from "public lands" and "Indian lands." "Indian
lands" is defined as "lands of Indian tribes, or Indian individuals, which are either held in trust
by the United States. . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4). "Public lands" includes such areas as lands
which are part of the national park system. Id. § 470bb(3). "Archaeological resource" includes
"any material remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest" and
are at least 100 years old. Id. § 470bb(1). Permits cannot be issued for excavation on Indian
lands without the consent of "the Indian or Indian tribe owning or having jurisdiction over such
lands." Id. § 470cc(g)(2). The related regulations provide that archaeological resources which
are excavated or removed from Indian lands "remain the property of the Indian or Indian tribe
having rights of ownership over such resources." 43 C.F.R. § 7.13(b). Permits are not required
for excavation and removal by tribes or tribal members of archaeological resources on the tribe's
Indian lands. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(1). In addition, if a permit "may result in harm to, or
destruction of, any religious or cultural site," then "any Indian tribe which may consider the site
as having religious or cultural importance" must first be notified, but tribal consent is not
required if the site is not on Indian land. Id. § 470cc(c). ARPA thus provides for only a limited
tribal role and only limited protection for sacred sites and artifacts.
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NAGPRA provides a number of important protections. First, it
provides for the repatriation of Native American human remains, and
certain other protected objects, referred to collectively as cultural items , 6
from the holdings of federal agencies and federally funded state and local
institutions" under specified circumstances." Secondly, NAGPRA
provides that Native American cultural items can be excavated or removed
from federal or tribal lands only after a permit has been obtained, and the
appropriate tribe has been consulted or, in the case of tribal lands, has
given consent. 9  Thirdly, NAGPRA provides for Native American
ownership or control of cultural items which are excavated or removed
from federal or tribal lands after the date of the statute. 4
Although NAGPRA falls short of providing complete protection
for Native American interests with respect to human and other remains
discovered at locations other than on tribal lands, it does reflect
considerable respect for the significance of human remains and cultural
and religious objects for Native Americans. It also reflects respect for the
tribal right to a role in controlling the excavation and removal of these
items from tribal lands. By providing for repatriation of human remains
and other items, NAGPRA has played a positive role in redressing some of
the harm done by years of desecration and plunder of Native American
graves and artifacts. It can, therefore, provide a potentially useful model
for other indigenous peoples who are seeking to recover and protect
human remains and objects of religious and cultural significance.
36. NAGPRA applies to "cultural items," defined to include human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects, and "cultural patrimony" (objects "having ongoing historical, traditional,
or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture itself . and which,
therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual. "). 25 U.S.C. §
3001(3).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(4) & (8).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 3005.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c). "Tribal lands" includes "all lands within the exterior boundaries
of any Indian reservation." Id. § 3001(15). By its terms, NAGPRA thus covers objects on
reservation lands which are owned by nonmembers of the tribe.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 3002. Depending on the circumstances, either an individual Native
American or a tribe will have ownership or control of a particular cultural item. Id. § 3002(a).
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